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Summary
Analyses of global fish stocks paint a mixed picture of suc-
cess, with some holding fishery management responsible
for the poor status of many stocks [1–3] or predicting
widespread collapse [1, 4]. Some suggest a stable [5] or
improving situation [6] in certain jurisdictions. The debate
is particularly polarized in the European Union, where the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been criticized for
failing to protect stocks [2, 7–10], while others argue that
a rebuilding process is underway [11, 12]. We show that
substantial change in stock trends occurred in the area
around the turn of the century: since then, the fishing pres-
sure (as measured by the exploitation rate) has reduced
continuously and there have been increases in biomass,
demonstrating the potential for stock recovery. In 2011,
for the first time, the majority of assessed stocks, where
reference points are defined, were fished sustainably. The
reductions in fishing pressure were associated with
declines in fishing effort. The last reform of the CFP, in
2002, introduced effort control as part of more enforceable
management measures, which were also based on longer-
term plans. Further reforms to the CFP are currently being
developed, so it is important, when correcting its weak-
nesses, to also acknowledge and build on the success of
a major reduction in the fishing pressure on European
fish stocks.
Results
The majority of fish stocks in the northeast Atlantic are
managed under the CFP of the European Union, while some
important stocks are also managed under national jurisdic-
tions and bilateral agreements. The status of these stocks is
determined by the International Council for the Exploration of
the Sea (ICES), the recognized authority that provides scienti-
fic advice to managers. The ICES compares indicators of the
exploitation rate (H, which quantifies the rate of removal of
fish due to fishing) and the spawning stock biomass (SSB,
which measures the total weight of adult fish) to agreed limit
reference points based on integration of the precautionary
approach with the theory of Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY) [13]. The desired state for a stock is for H to be at or
below HMSY (the exploitation rate that is consistent with
achieving MSY) and for SSB to be at or greater than MSY
Btrigger (the SSB that triggers advice to reduce exploitation
rates below HMSY). The exploitation rate is the one variable
that fishery managers can directly influence and is therefore*Correspondence: fernandespg@abdn.ac.ukof particular interest in evaluation of both the status of stocks
and the success of management.
We examined the status of 57 stocks monitored over 60
years in the northeast Atlantic as routinely assessed by the
ICES. We first compared the relative difference, DH/HMSY,
between the exploitation rate for each stock and the exploita-
tion rate consistent with achieving MSY for each of the avail-
able years (where DH = H 2 HMSY). In four stock groupings,
pelagic, demersal round fish, flatfish, and cod (Gadusmorhua)
DH/HMSY has been in decline in recent years (Figure 1), with
many stocks now being fished sustainably.
In the pelagic stocks, which include herring (Clupea
harengus),mackerel (Scomber scombrus), andhorsemackerel
(Trachurus trachurus),DH/HMSY has been declining since 1998
and was negative from 2008, indicating that most exploitation
rates have fallen below the MSY exploitation rate limit. Simi-
larly, many demersal round fish species, notably haddock
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus), whiting (Merlangius merlangus),
and saithe (Pollachius virens), which were subjected to very
high fishing mortalities for sustained periods in the 1980s
and 1990s, experienced much lower exploitation rates in
the 2000s, and the average DH/HMSY has been just less than
zero since 2010. For flatfish (plaice, Pleuronectes platessa;
sole,Solea solea; andmegrim, Lepidorhombus spp.),DH/HMSY
values remain on average above zero but have been declining
since 1997 and consistently since 2005. The eight stocks of
cod show themost variability in exploitation rate, and although
on average these have also been declining since 2004, the
exploitation rates typically remain above reference values.
However, overall, estimates of average DH/HMSY for 2011 are
nowcloser to that which is consistent with achievingmaximum
sustainable yield than they have been since the early 1960s.
With these reductions in exploitation rate, the formal status
of stocks in relation to HMSY has improved considerably since
the last CFP review in 2002 (Figure 2). Overall, the number of
stocks fished below HMSY in the entire area increased from
12 in 2002 to 25 in 2011. In the CFP area (mainly the Baltic
Sea, North Sea, Celtic Sea, Southern European Atlantic shelf,
and widely distributed stocks) the number of stocks fished
below HMSY has increased from ten to 22 (out of 36 stocks),
meaning that more than 60% of these stocks are currently
being fished sustainably. In addition, for many of those stocks
that are still overexploited, the extent of overfishing has
reduced, as shown in the reduction in size of the red circles
in Figure 2, which is consistent with the trends seen in Figure 1.
Looking at the geographical distribution of DH, a fairly even
distribution of stock status is apparent, with many sustainably
fished stocks occurring within the CFP jurisdiction. A few
stocks in, mainly in northern waters, show a decline in status,
however. The situation in terms of SSB has also improved (Fig-
ure S1 available online). We identified 44 stocks with defined
MSY Btrigger reference points from the 57 examined here: 34
(77%) had SSBs greater than MSY Btrigger in 2011 compared
to 27 (61%) in 2002.
To examine historical recovery in these stocks, we calcu-
lated the slope of the linear trend over a 10-year period for
the SSB and the exploitation rate. The proportion of stocks
each year that were improving or deteriorating with respect
Figure 1. Time Series of the Difference in Exploi-
tation Rate relative to HMSY for 47 Northeast
Atlantic Fish Stocks
The exploitation rate minus the exploitation rate
consistent with maximum sustainable yield ex-
pressed as a proportion of HMSY (i.e. DH/HMSY)
from 1960–2001 (crosses, prior to the 2002 CFP
reform) and 2002–2011 (dots, after reform) sepa-
rated into habitat and species groupings: (A)
pelagic (herring, mackerel, sprat, horse mack-
erel); (B) demersal (haddock, whiting, hake,
saithe, Norway pout); (C) flatfish (plaice, sole,
megrim, halibut); and (D) cod stocks. The solid
black line is the average for each group and
shows how the relative difference in exploitation
rates have declined consistently since the 2002
reform (dotted vertical line). See also Figure S2.
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approximately 2000, the largest proportion of stocks was
deteriorating, with increasing exploitation rate and declining
biomass (Figure 3A). However, since then, this situation has
reversed, with the greatest number of stocks showing
declining exploitation rate and increasing biomass. Figure 3B
shows that over the most recent decade, close to 70% of
stocks had either decreasing exploitation rates or increasing
SSB. It is noticeable that the improvement occurred just before
or around the time of the revision of the CFP in 2002.
To explain these changes, we also examined the available
evidence for changes in fishing effort (Figure S2). Total fishing
effort can be considered capacity (number, size, or power of
vessels) multiplied by activity (number of days spent at sea).
Since 2002, effort as measured by the combinedmetric of kilo-
watt days at sea [14] has declined in all the major segments of
the fishing fleet by at least 20% and by almost 50% in those
fleets targeting flatfish (Figure S2B). Overall fishing effort, by
whatever metric, has been reduced significantly in the last
10 years (Figure S2). The data on fishing effort by fishing fleet
indicate that the change in relative exploitation rate (DH/HMSY)
was correlated to the changes in fishing effort (Figure 4) and
is highly significant for each of the four fish groupings. This is
notably the case for the demersal grouping, including cod, (Fig-
ures 4B and 4D) where both metrics were relatively unchanged
from 2002 to 2005 and then declined from 2006 to 2011.
Discussion
Our analysis shows that over the last decade there have been
substantial reductions in exploitation rate with concomitantimprovement in stock status. The re-
ductions in exploitation rate in the
most recent decade can, at least in
part, be explained by reductions in
fishing effort. This does not support
the view expressed by many commen-
tators that the CFP has failed [1, 7,
9, 10]. These studies have tended to
focus on how catch limits are set in
relation to scientific advice rather than
consider the actual change in exploita-
tion rate which is the main determinant
of successful management.
The ingredients for successful fish-
eries management are complex and
include scientific, economic, and social factors [15]. An anal-
ysis of fishery management worldwide [16] found that ‘‘legally
enforceable and tested exploitation strategies, coupled with
appropriate rights-based incentives to the fishing community’’
were linked to better performing management systems. It
seems likely that changing policy embracing these features
contributed to sustained reductions in fishing pressure which
in turn facilitated stock recovery.
Prior to 2002, fishery management was typically reliant on
output controls to regulate exploitation rate. These took
the form of annual total allowable catches (TACs) and implic-
itly assumed that fishing would cease when the catch limit
was reached but in reality only limited landings since they
permitted discards in EU waters. Such limits tended to be
set above scientific advice [1] and were derived from catch
forecasts with inadequate precision [17] and biased catch
information [18]. Political pressures meant that they were
set on the basis of short-term pressures rather than a long-
term strategy [19]. It was apparent that the system was not
effective [20], not least because fishing often continued
after the TAC was exhausted, with fish either being dumped
at sea or landed illegally. Earlier in the CFP, attempts were
also made to reduce capacity by the removal of fishing
vessels through decommissioning schemes. These ‘‘Multi-
Annual Guidance Programmes’’ (MAGP I to MAGP IV, from
1983 to 2002) were not considered to be particularly effective
in reducing capacity [21] (though vessel numbers decreased,
Figure S2A) because it was inactive vessels that tended
to exit the fleet. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that
in the late 20th century most stocks were deteriorating
(Figure 3).
Figure 2. The Geographical Distribution of the Difference in Exploitation Rate for 57 Northeast Atlantic Fish Stocks
The difference in exploitation rate (DH) is the exploitation rate (Hyear) minus the exploitation rate consistent withmaximum sustainable yield (HMSY) in (A) 2002
and (B) 2011. The size of the circle is proportional to the absolute difference in DH and is color coded according to status. Stocks in green are fished within
sustainable limits,while stocks in redhave exploitation rates in excess of these limits; hence, the larger the red circle, themore the stock is overfished, and the
larger the green circle, the more the stock is underfished. The circles are positioned approximately according to the center of the stock location in the ICES
ecoregions (labeled),with the exceptionof thewidely distributed stocks,whicharepositioned to thewesternedgeof the continental shelf. Anabbreviation for
the species name is provided in the center of each circle: ane, Engraulis encrasicolus; cap, Mallotus villosus; cod, Gadus morhua; ghl, Reinhardtius
hippoglossoides; had,Melanogrammus aeglefinus; her,Clupea harengus; hke,Merlucciusmerluccius; hom, Trachurus trachurus; mac,Scomber scombrus;
mgb, Lepidorhombus boscii; mgw, Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis; nop, Trisopterus esmarkii; ple, Pleuronectes platessa; sai, Pollachius virens; san,
Ammodytidae; sar, Sardina pilchardus; sol, Solea solea; spr, Sprattus sprattus; whb, Micromesistius poutassou; whg, Merlangius merlangus. Stocks for
which there are no reference points are abbreviated as text alone followed by a question mark. See also Figure S1 for equivalent distribution of relative SSB.
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1434Prior to 2002 CFP reform, and in response to these recog-
nized weaknesses and acute economic pressures arising
from declining stocks, some countries began to implement
substantial fleet reduction schemes and fishing gear technical
measures around 2000 to lessen dependence on TACs in order
to reduce fishing pressure. Further major policy changes were
introduced under CFP reform in 2002 [19], including detailed
stock recovery plans, enhanced effort control (restrictions on
days at sea), and the setting of multiannual catch limits with
more strategic biomass targets, an approach analogous to
‘‘management procedures’’ adopted in a number of regions
to strengthen management [22]. These plans, now more
generally known as multiannual plans, are characterized by
clear time-limited objectives that follow a distinct set of
harvest control rules. The plans are explicitly agreed with
stakeholders and use distinct biological reference points
that determine the annual exploitation rate appropriate to the
objectives [23]. Additionally, they lay down other measures
to support sustainable management. Examples of manage-
ment plans considered to be successful include those forNorth Sea herring [23, 24] and Eastern Baltic cod [24, 25].
Recovery plans were initially introduced for seriously depleted
stocks and included most of the major cod stocks [26] and the
stocks of northern and southern hake. A feature of these
recovery plans, at least in the CFP, was to reduce fishing effort
(largely through reductions in days at sea) each year by suc-
cessively larger proportions, until the estimated exploitation
rate had reached the desired target. Two key features of the
2002 reform, effort control and multiannual catch limits, were
therefore brought together in recovery plans.
There were also developments toward improved compli-
ance, which in turn has led to improved quality of scientific
data [25]. A satellite vessel-monitoring system was introduced
in 1998 [27], and the establishment of a European Fisheries
Control Agency in 2005 [28] has coordinated fishery control
and inspections and standards. Several states have intro-
duced sales audits in the fish supply chain [29, 30] that
have addressed illegal or ‘‘black’’ landings. Enforceability is
improved not simply by virtue of more advanced technology,
but also by amore inclusive engagement with fishers and other
Figure 3. Proportion of Fish Stocks in the Northeast Atlantic with Different
Categories of Exploitation Based on a Moving 10-Year Trend with Time
The top panel (A) shows the proportion of stocks in two categories classified
by exploitation rate (H) and spawning stock biomass (SSB). Each point
corresponds to the trend calculated in the 10-year period preceding that
year. The solid line shows improving stocks and the dotted line deteriorating
stocks. The lower panel (B) also shows the same analysis, but classifies
stocks only by exploitation rate (dotted line) or SSB (solid line).
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1435stakeholders in decision making: this was also addressed in
the 2002 reform with the establishment of the Regional Advi-
sory Councils (RACs). In addition, many countries, such as
the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, introduced tradable
fishing rights, a system already operating in many parts of
the world with some success [31] that gives fishers greater
incentives to conserve the resource. All these changes attempt
to reflect the requirements for successful management [16]
and represent a move away from reliance on annual catch
limits alone toward input controls that effect exploitation rate
directly such as reductions in fishing effort and fleet capacity.
The improvement during the last decade is not universal.
While the status of many stocks has changed for the better,
it is notable that most cod stocks remain in a poor state
despite increasingly stringent management measures. There
is a continuing problem of discards, which now involves
marketable fish [32] and exposes a significant weakness in
the CFP that needs to be addressed in the proposed reforms
for 2014. The poor state of cod stocks is also evident in thenorthwest Atlantic, and thismay be indicative of environmental
or other ecosystem changes [33, 34]. It highlights the need to
consider ecological and climatic effects into the derivation of
sustainable exploitation rates and to avoid sole reliance on
static MSY reference points.
The reduction in fishing pressure should be seen as the
first—andmost difficult [35]—step in achieving the goal of sus-
tainable fisheries, which should result in increasing biomass.
The fact that reduced exploitation rates are being realized
shows that, even in difficult circumstances, positive gains
can be made by focusing on a multifaceted approach. Reduc-
tions in exploitation rate are important not simply for the pro-
ductivity of the fisheries themselves but also for the future of
marine ecosystems. It is recognized that while much fishery
management still relies on a single-species approach, a simple
reduction in exploitation rate is ‘‘perhaps the most significant
step one could take towards ensuring the persistence of
marine ecosystems.’’ [36]. It offers hope for the health of
marine ecosystems and themanagement of theworld’s fishery
resources when future demands for food will only increase.
Experimental Procedures
Status in Relation to Reference Points
We examined the status of 57 stocks monitored over 60 years in the north-
east Atlantic that are routinely assessed by the ICES, the recognized author-
ity that provides scientific advice to managers. Assessment data were pro-
vided by the ICES at http://www.ices.dk/marine-data/dataset-collections/
Pages/Fish-catch-and-stock-assessment.aspx. We obtained additional
data from individual expert group reports of assessments of northern
hake, Irish Sea cod, Bay of Biscay anchovy, Bothnian herring, southern
horse mackerel, and the two species of megrim in the Bay of Biscay. We
consulted the reports of ICES expert groups to obtain estimates of fishing
mortality at MSY (FMSY) and the spawning stock biomass that triggers a
cautious response (MSY Btrigger). Although the quantity F is widely used,
its scale has no upper bound, so for ease of interpretation we converted F
to the annual exploitation rate (H), which is defined on the interval (0,1)
[37], where H = 1 2 e2F. For most stocks, MSY reference points were avail-
able; where they weren’t, we used target reference points from themanage-
ment plan (MP) specific to the stock (n = 4 for FMP, n = 5 for SSBMP) where
appropriate or the precautionary (pa) reference point (n = 4 for Fpa, n = 6 for
SSBpa). This gave us data on fishing mortality and spawning stock biomass
for 57 stocks (for Figure 3), but only 47 stocks had reference points to
estimate DH/HMSY (for Figures 1 and 2), and only 44 stocks had reference
points for biomass (DSSB, for Figure S1). A summary of this information
for all the stocks that were examined is available in Table S1.
The yearly averages of DH/HMSY for all stocks were adequately repre-
sented by the arithmetic mean in most cases (the distributions of DH/HMSY
were not significantly different from normal, as determined by the
Anderson-Darling test for normality), so we represented the average by
the arithmetic mean.
Analysis of Trends
We calculated the slope of the linear trend of H and SSBwith time for amov-
ing 10-year window. For each window, we calculated the proportion of
stocks that were deteriorating (increasing H, decreasing SSB) or improving
(decreasing H, increasing SSB). We also calculated the proportion of all
stocks that had decreasing H or increasing SSB. In each case, we labeled
the window by the year at the end of the 10-year period.
Analysis of Effort Data
Fishing vessel effort data (in millions of kilowatt days) of the principal fishing
EUmember states operating in the northeast Atlantic, assembled by the EU
Scientific Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries, is available
from 2002 onward [14]. We extracted data for the vessel gear categories
corresponding to those targeting pelagic, demersal, and flat fish and corre-
lated this with exploitation rate over the same period. We used data from
nations that had the full range of data from 2002–2011 (Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the UK). Adjustments were made to account for missing or spurious data
as follows: Spain did not provide data in 2011 and provided a reduced
Figure 4. Relationships between Fishing Effort
and the Mean Difference in Exploitation Rate
Relative to HMSY
Fishing effort combines fishing vessel capacity in
kilowatts with days spent at sea fishing and has
units of kilowatt days. The difference in exploita-
tion rate relative to HMSY is the exploitation
rate minus the exploitation rate consistent with
maximum sustainable yield expressed as a pro-
portion of HMSY (i.e. DH/HMSY). These two quanti-
ties were estimated in each year from 2002–2011
(year indicated in the centre of each point) and
were separated into habitat and species group-
ings: (A) effort attributed to pelagic fishing gear
against the mean DH/HMSY for pelagic species
(herring, mackerel, sprat, horse mackerel), (B)
effort attributed to demersal fishing gear (bottom
trawls, otter trawls, seine nets, drift nets)
against the mean DH/HMSY for demersal species
(haddock, whiting, hake, saithe, Norway pout),
(C) effort attributed to beam trawls against the
mean DH/HMSY for flatfish (plaice, sole, megrim,
halibut), and (D) effort attributed to demersal
fishing gear against the mean DH/HMSY for cod
stocks. The mean DH/HMSY is the data shown
as the solid line as the average for each group
in Figure 2. In each panel, the Pearson’s product
moment correlation coefficient (r) is reported
along with the sample size (n) and the signifi-
cance (p) truncated to two significant digits.
See also Figure S2 for the time series of fishing
effort.
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1436data set in 2010, so in these cases we assumed values to be the same as
those reported for 2009; French data from 2002 were spuriously high [14],
so we replaced these with the average of values from 2001 and 2003.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes two figures and one table and can be
found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.06.016.
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